釋放安寧價值
Unlocking value for ENM

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Resignation of INED

Published: 12:30pm, 18 Dec, 2023

Dear the directors of ENM Holdings Limited (ENM),

We note that the Mr. Ted Lee, one of the independent non-executive directors (INED) of ENM, has just resigned from ENM with immediate effect.

The resignation of one INED alone will not cure the multitude of ailments that currently plague ENM, which we have already identified in our first letter: an underperforming portfolio of legacy assets that have no synergies with one another, the high cost of maintaining a listed company that has no good reason to remain listed, as well as the large difference between the share price and the net asset value. The board has yet to address these issues.

To help rectify these issues, I volunteer that a member of the ASM team shall be appointed as a director of ENM. Again, the ASM team has a long track record of liquidating listed companies, shutting down businesses and returning capital to shareholders. As a shareholder of ENM, ASM is fully aligned in our interest with all the other shareholders in maximizing and unlocking value.

Yours sincerely,
Kin Chan
Chief Investment Officer
Argyle Street Management

[明報專訊] Argyle Street發公開信促安寧清盤 不滿私有化失敗 斥俱樂部泳池任由馬騮游水

Published: 5:45pm, 14 Nov, 2023

原文網址: 明報專訊 https://news.mingpao.com/pns/%E7%B6%93%E6%BF%9F/article/20231113/s00004/1699807321800

【明報專訊】香港基金公司Argyle Street Management向安寧控股(0128)董事發公開信,對先前華懋集團母企參明有限公司提出私有化的計劃失敗,感到失望及不滿,對安寧未來前景感到悲觀,要求安寧清盤,並將所有資金立即退還予股東,更表明他們不再對安寧董事會抱有任何信心。Argyle Street合伙人陳健對本報表示,「寧願將公司(指安寧)清盤,好過將俱樂部(指安寧位於荃灣的物業資產,即顯達鄉村俱樂部)的泳池任由馬騮游水!」

明報記者
事實上,早於8月時網上曾瘋傳有大批野猴,闖入荃灣老圍顯達鄉村俱樂部內的泳池「嬉水」。

批評資產管理不善
Argyle Street於信中指,安寧最大的資產為位於荃灣的顯達鄉村俱樂部的土地,更直言安寧於大規模住宅重建方面沒有往績,同時亦在資金方面有限,無法獨自承擔價值數十億元的重建項目,認為該項目的發展商應為華懋集團,更指私有化方案本為安寧股東及華懋集團「雙贏」的方案。

另外,Argyle Street亦批評安寧資產管理不善,令先前有野猴闖入該項目的泳池。

Argyle Street聲言目前擁有安寧約1%股份,該公司表示,有於私有化方案中投贊成票,更指該私有化方案提出的作價,較方案提出前的股價溢價四成至五成,更指方案僅較2023年6月安寧的淨資產總值(NAV)折讓約12%,指該私有化方案,對於小型房地產公司而言,或為近年以來最合理的私有化嘗試之一。

Argyle Street續指出,於私有化方案首次公告後與方案失敗的3個月間,從未獲安寧的正式聯繫,以說明私有化方案的細節。

對私有化投票率低有懷疑
該基金公司亦提到,僅有17%擁投票權的安寧股東出席有關私有化投票的股東大會,更指該投票率遠低於過往其他香港公司私有化案例的水平,質疑安寧有否與其他少數股東進行溝通,並質疑安寧董事會是否真心希望達成私有化。


[香港01] 安寧控股私有化失敗 亞皆老街基金稱感驚訝 發公開信要求其清盤

Published: 5:00pm, 14 Nov, 2023

原文網址: 安寧控股私有化失敗 亞皆老街基金稱感驚訝 發公開信要求其清盤 | 香港01
https://www.hk01.com/article/960909?utm_source=01articlecopy&utm_medium=referral

安寧控股﹙0128﹚早前獲大股東華懋集團以溢價24.7%提私有化,惟最後「撻Q」收場。事件觸發公司另一股東、本地基金「亞皆老街」(Argyle Street Management)感到失望和不滿,今日﹙12日﹚發公開信指,直言看不見安寧的未來,要求將公司清盤,把所得資金分派予股東。

申報持有安寧約1%的亞皆老街基金指出,將安寧清盤,是在目前情況下,董事局唯一可以做的負責任行為,該基金建議安寧應贖回所有基金投資、更換「昂貴」的董事、出售中巴﹙0026﹚在內的上市投資、出售荃灣鄉村俱樂部重建項目、出售虧損的時裝品牌詩韻(Swank)予戰略投資者、出售工廈等。

直言對管理層失信心

今次事件的觸發點,為安寧私有化失敗。亞皆老街基金直言,對結果感到驚訝,該基金指,由私有化方案公布至表決期間,一直未獲安寧主動接觸,解釋私有化細節,因而不禁認為,董事局並無履行職責,教育股東私有化的好處;同時,私有化表決結果顯示,只得17%無利害關係股東有份投票,亞皆老街基金認為,私有化方案出價合理,惟投票率遠低於其他本港上市公司私有化計劃,因此推測,安寧董事會對私有化方案過於自信,因而他們覺得無需與股東交流。

安寧9月底私有化失敗後,股價單日大插25%,現價較資產折讓一半,亞皆老街基金直言損害股東利益,表明鑒於安寧歷史股價表現和私有化失敗,不再對公司董事會抱有信心。

亞皆老街基金補充,安寧最大單一項目是荃灣鄉村俱樂部重建項目,惟不認為公司在大型住宅再發展項目有往績及能力,亦未必能做到大額融資。

Argyle Street合伙人陳健向《香港01》稱,對事件感到「很憤怒」,目前安寧如「無王管」,大股東華懋亦無向董事會施壓,因此寧願將公司清盤。


荃灣老圍顯達鄉村俱樂部馬騮出沒 公然在泳池戲水如同水上樂園

Published: 11:00am, 13 Nov, 2023


Enough is enough: liquidate ENM now

Published: 9:30am, 13 Nov, 2023

Dear the directors of ENM Holdings Limited (ENM),

We, Argyle Street Management (ASM), are a fund manager based in Hong Kong.  The funds managed by us are long-term shareholders of ENM, and currently own approximately 1% shares in ENM.

Following the failure of the scheme of arrangement (Scheme) to privatize ENM by Solution Bridge Limited (an entity under the ChinaChem Group (ChinaChem)), we hope to express our disappointment and displeasure at the board of ENM.

At this juncture, we see no long-term future for ENM.  We propose that ENM shall be liquidated, and capital shall be returned to shareholders urgently.  Frankly, in our opinion, this is the only responsible act the board of ENM could enact given the circumstances.

The failed Scheme would have been a win-win solution for all stakeholders

In the scheme document, the independent board committee of ENM said that the Scheme was “fair and reasonable”, and recommended minority shareholders to vote in favour.

ASM agreed and did vote in favour.  The “cancellation price” (i.e. privatization share price) represented a massive premium of approximately 40-50% above pre-Scheme share prices.  The cancellation price was merely at 12% discount to ENM’s net asset value (NAV) in June 2023.  This is perhaps one of the most reasonable privatization attempts for small-cap real estate companies that we have seen in many years.  Many other privatization deals have been done successfully at much larger discount to NAV.  We applaud the team for being fair to all stakeholders in this regard.

Also consider the fact that ENM’s single largest asset is the redevelopment project in Tsuen Wan (i.e. Hilltop Country Club).  ENM has no recent track record in large-scale residential redevelopment, and limited ability to fund a multi-billion-dollar project on its own.  The logical developer of the project is a major property group such as ChinaChem.  The Scheme was indeed a sensible and win-win solution for both ChinaChem and the shareholders of ENM.  We were looking forward to seeing this project coming to fruition in the future helping alleviate the housing shortage of our city.

It is therefore beyond shocking that the Scheme failed.  We understand that other minority shareholders might have different views on the Scheme.  It is their prerogative to vote in favour or against.  But the fact that ASM, as a relatively large minority shareholder, was not contacted by ENM to articulate the details of the Scheme leads us to wonder whether the board performed its duties to help educate shareholders the merits of the Scheme.

Did ENM even try to engage with the shareholders?

As a relatively large minority shareholder of ENM, we are shocked that ENM (whose independent board committee recommend shareholders to vote in favour) has never contacted us formally to discuss the merits of the proposed Scheme, let alone trying to secure ASM’s votes, during the three-month period between the initial announcement of the Scheme and its failure.

ENM certainly knew that ASM was a shareholder.  In fact, ASM did a transaction with ENM in 2016, in which ASM bought shares in China Motor Bus (26 HK) from ENM.  Since then, ASM and ENM have maintained contact and discussed the businesses of ENM on many occasions.  ASM is probably one of the few institutional investors who has been interested in ENM over the years. 

In hindsight, given the low turnout at the court meeting of the Scheme, ASM’s vote (in favour) was quite significant, but was not enough to change the outcome.  Only 17% of the voting rights of eligible (i.e. “disinterested”) shareholders attended the EGM.  This turnout was much lower than what has been typical in other privatizations in Hong Kong.  If the board of ENM did not bother to engage with ASM properly, we start to wonder if they talked to other minority shareholders.   We certainly start to wonder whether the board even sincerely wished to complete the proposed Scheme.

We speculate that another scenario might be true:  the ENM board had so much (misguided) confidence that the Scheme would succeed, that they felt there was no need to talk to the shareholders.  If they believed that it was sufficient to merely upload to the HKEx website a 146-page-long jargon-filled scheme document and then expect the unwavering support of the minority (and mostly retail) shareholders, then the ENM board has serious governance, competence, and investor relations issues.  If this is true, then the arrogance of the ENM board and its lack of respect for minority shareholders are mind-boggling.

ENM’s strange portfolio of legacy assets has no synergies and results in depressed share price

ENM has a strange collection of mostly legacy assets that have no synergies with one another:

  • Swank fashion retail stores
    • Swank is well known to be Nina Wang’s “toy” when she was alive
    • Retail format such as Swank is way past its prime and in any event, it is not clear to us that the board of ENM has the ability to manage a luxury retail business
    • Do not blame Covid-19:  the fashion segment of ENM suffered from full-year losses in all of the past ten financial years, with total segment losses of almost HK$300 million in that period (vs. current market capitalization of HK$ 554m)
  • A portfolio of investment funds and discretionary accounts managed by various international managers (e.g. PIMCO, Morgan Stanley)
    • These account for almost half of ENM’s total assets in June 2023. 
    • If ENM shareholders want to invest in PIMCO or Morgan Stanley-managed funds, they can do so themselves.  Shareholders do not need to pay the board of ENM millions of HK$ per year and spend even more to maintain a listed company, in order for the board to play fund-of-fund manager.
    • ENM is not a fund manager.  ENM should have returned excess capital to shareholders instead of playing with shareholders’ money in investments that they have little expertise in
  • Shares in China Motor Bus (CMB)
    • That is a real estate company in Hong Kong which has significant governance issues and no viable succession plan
    • ASM, which has been actively engaging with CMB over the years, is not aware of what ENM has done to optimize the value of this position
  • Hilltop country club in Tsuen Wan, which is a residential redevelopment project
    • This is a critical asset from a value standpoint.  Presently, the asset is poorly managed (as the club’s guests who share the its swimming pool with wild monkeys could probably testify), which suffered from heavy losses even before Covid-19.  It would be a perfect solution monetizing it by selling the asset to ChinaChem
    • Financially, it is impossible for ENM to handle this redevelopment project with an estimated cost at over HK$6 billion (many times the market cap of ENM)
    • On its own, ENM would never be able to realize value from owning this asset
  • Some strata units of an old industrial building in Kwai Chung, which has little strategic value

From our experience, ENM is precisely the type of listed company that almost always trade at large discount to NAV, to the detriment of all shareholders (including ChinaChem).  The market has spoken:  after the failure of the Scheme, ENM’s share price is now trading at half of its NAV per share.

Delay no more:  liquidate ENM

Looking at historical share price performance and the failure of the Scheme, we no longer have faith in the board of ENM.

To narrow the discount to NAV and stop the cash bleed, we propose that ENM shall liquidate all its assets, implement cost-saving measures and return capital to shareholders, by doing all of the following urgently:

  • Redeem all of its investment funds or discretionary account that can be redeemed
  • Replace the expensive board
  • Sell all its listed investments (including China Motor Bus shares)
  • Sell the redevelopment project in Tsuen Wan
  • Sell the industrial building units
  • Sell loss-making Swank to a strategic investor (or shut it down if that fails)
  • Sell all other residual assets
  • Distribute all disposal proceeds to shareholders and stop making new investments

Given the large and unnecessary costs of maintaining a listed company, there is no real reason for a company like ENM to remain listed.  It is only logical that ENM shall be delisted once liquidation is completed.

The ASM team has a long track record of liquidating listed companies, shutting down businesses and returning capital to shareholders.  If the ENM board is unable to do so, we are happy to appoint our representatives at the board the ENM, to facilitate the liquidation exercise.

Yours sincerely,

Kin Chan
Chief Investment Officer
Argyle Street Management